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Abstract 
This paper uses a major change in the compulsory schooling policy in Turkey – which 
increased the mandatory duration from five to eight years -- to estimate the causal effect of 
education on earnings. The policy reform brought about a substantial rise in schooling 
attainment due to the high dropout rates at the end of compulsory schooling, the duration of 
extension, as well as the spillover effects of the policy on non-compulsory schooling years. 
Our results show that the 2SLS estimates of the returns to education are much larger estimates 
than the OLS estimates. These results also constitute the first causal estimates of the returns to 
education in the Turkish context and one of the few in developing country contexts. 
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I. Introduction 
A growing body of literature estimates the return to education using different 
techniques to overcome the biases involved in an OLS framework. These studies are mostly 
conducted for developed countries in the North American and European contexts. This paper 
aims to estimate the causal effects of the education on earnings in a developing country 
context using a major reform that increased the duration of compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 
years. Due to high dropout rates at the end of compulsory school period, this policy change in 
the Turkish context affected a large fraction of the student population – which brings our local 
average treatment effect estimate closer to the average treatment effect, as in the case of 
Oreopoulos (2006).  
Our identification strategy for estimating the rates of return to schooling is similar to 
that of earlier studies that use the discontinuities in school attainment due to changes in school 
leaving ages (e.g. Oreopoulous 2006, Devereux and Hart 2010). The estimated returns of 
2SLS strategy are at the high end of the reported results from similar 2SLS results in 
developed country contexts. This result is consistent with earlier studies that suggest that the 
earnings premium by level of education is steeper in developing countries (Patrinos et al 
2010). A comparison of the OLS results to 2SLS results also indicates large downward biases 
in the OLS estimates similar to findings from other studies.  
In the section we provide a review of earlier literature followed by a discussion of the 
data sources used in this study in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the methodology while Section 
5 presents the preliminary research results. Section 6 concludes. 
II. Previous literature 
Earlier studies on the economic returns to schooling point out the relationship between 
education and economic growth. Becker (1964) and Griliches (1970) report that rising 
education levels in the U.S. after the World War II contribute substantially to its economic 
growth. The literature that follow this finding address the issue that how much of this 
observed economic return to schooling is due to the ability bias—does schooling really make 
people more productive, or is it that more able people are more likely to acquire higher levels 
of schooling? In a seminal work, Griliches (1977) show that the ability bias—which causes 
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overestimation of the actual returns to schooling—is small; and, in fact, other source of biases 
like measurement error—which cause underestimation of the actual return—could be more 
important. 
Since the 1990s, with the pioneering study of Angrist and Krueger (1991), many 
studies use certain institutional features of schooling systems in various countries as a source 
of exogenous variation in schooling so that the returns to schooling in terms of earnings can 
be estimated consistently. Angrist and Krueger show that in the U.S. individuals who are born 
earlier in the year have, on average, a higher level of schooling than individuals who are born 
later in the year—which they attribute to the compulsory schooling laws in the U.S.. Angrist 
and Krueger and other studies that exploit differences in school start age use quarter-of-birth 
as an instrumental variable for completed years of schooling, as well as the interactions of 
quarter of birth with year of birth and state of birth as additional instruments.1 Carneiro and 
Heckman (2002) find an association between the quarter of birth and certain indicators for 
early childhood development. Such an association could mean that quarter of birth influences 
wages not only through schooling investment but also through other channels as well, which 
would invalidate the instrument that assumes that quarter of birth is independent of tastes for 
schooling and schooling ability. Bound et al. (1995) point out the weak instrument problem 
and the resulting asymptotic bias in 2SLS estimates toward the OLS estimate in this context 
that is further addressed by Staiger and Stock (1997). Several studies in the literature also 
employ alternative instruments based on distance to nearest college (Kane and Rouse, 1993; 
Card, 1995; Connely and Uusitalo, 1997; Maluccio, 1997), family background variables 
(Card, 1995), new school construction (Duflo, 2001) at various locations.  
Changes in compulsory schooling laws as instrumental variables for schooling have 
been employed by several studies in the literature. Harmon and Walker (1995) use the 
changes in compulsory schooling duration in the U.K. in 1947 and in 1973 as a source of 
exogenous variation in completed years of schooling to find the return to schooling in terms 
of earnings. Their identification strategy is based on comparison of birth cohorts that are 
                                               
1
 Compulsory schooling laws, as an instrument, are also used by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) in their 
analysis of human capital externalities. 
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affected by the policy with those that are not affected. A limitation of the Harmon and Walker 
study is that they do not allow for a secular time trend in schooling of successive birth 
cohorts. Oreopoulos (2006) uses the same instrument that Harmon and Walker (1995) utilized 
– the change in compulsory schooling law in the U.K. and Ireland context. His identification 
strategy also relies on a comparison of the birth cohorts that are affected by the policy with 
those that are not. Unlike the Harmon and Walker study, however, Oreopoulos (2006) 
accounts for birth cohort effects on education, as well as the effect of the education policy. An 
important issue in these studies is that the time frame of their analysis also covers other 
events—in particular, World War II—that also had a substantial effect on schooling 
outcomes. This issue is important since the methodology requires the timing of the policy be 
independent of the conditions for the whole economy. Other studies that utilize compulsory 
school laws to estimate returns to schooling include Devereux and Hart (2010) in the UK 
context, Pischke and von Wachter (2008) in the German context. 
Most of the above mentioned studies find that 2SLS estimates of returns to schooling are 
either higher than or not much different from the OLS estimates. This finding is not consistent 
with the ability bias argument – which argues  that more able people acquire higher levels of 
schooling; therefore, the coefficient for schooling in the OLS estimates also captures the 
effect of unobserved ability.  
There have been a number of arguments in the literature as to this apparent 
contradiction. Bound and Jaeger (1996) argue that the unobserved differences between the 
characteristics of treatment and control groups in IV estimation could cause a bias—in the 
upward direction—that is much bigger than the ability bias. This would especially be 
important in studies where the instrument is far from being ideal, in other words far from 
satisfying the conditional independence assumption. Another potential explanation to the 
lower OLS estimates compared to 2SLS estimates, as put forward by Angrist and Krueger 
(1991), is the attenuation bias in OLS estimates due to measurement errors. This bias would 
be more important if the measurement error is especially high for individuals who are most 
affected by the source of exogenous variation in schooling. In fact, Kane et al. (1997) report 
some evidence for this. 
A third explanation for the lower OLS estimates compared to IV estimates is due to 
heterogeneity in returns to education. Imbens and Angrist (1994) illustrate that the 2SLS 
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estimates give the effect for the set of compliers—those who are induced to change their 
schooling problem as a result of the exogenous source of variation in schooling. The set of 
compliers may not be representative of the whole population. For instance, in Angrist and 
Krueger (1991), individuals who are forced to have longer schooling due to compulsory 
schooling laws are those with lower levels of education. Card (1999, 2001) argues that if these 
individuals with low levels of schooling have higher marginal rate of returns to schooling, the 
2SLS estimates would be higher than OLS ones, as found in the literature. In other words, the 
estimates derived from the changes in compulsory school leaving age provide local treatment 
effects (LATE) for compilers – the group affected by the policy change. Oreopoulos (2006) 
notes that as the fraction of the population affected by the policy change increases, the LATE 
estimate approaches the average treatment effect (ATE). Using a much larger set of compliers 
Oreopoulos (2006) finds 2SLS estimates in the UK context that are not much different than 
that found by Angrist and Krueger. Devereux and Hart (2010), however, find much lower 
returns in the same context.  Pischke and von Wachter (2008) similarly report much lower IV 
estimates (zero returns) than the OLS estimates in the German context. Thus, there is mixed 
evidence from these developed country contexts about the IV and OLS estimates of the 
returns to education. 
In this paper, similar to Harman and Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2006), we 
compare birth cohorts that are affected by the 1997 education policy in Turkey (1986 and later 
birth cohorts) with those that are not affected (1985 and earlier birth cohorts). Our 
identification strategy allows for a time trend in schooling as well as earnings outcomes, in 
addition to the effect of the education policy. Also, in the time frame of our analysis, there 
were no macro events that had a major impact on schooling. According to the national 
education statistics during the 1996-97 education year, the year before the law change, at the 
primary school - covering grades 1 to 5- the net male enrollment rate was % 91,8 while the 
corresponding net enrollment rate at the junior high school –covering grades 6 to 8- was % 
60,6 (TUIK, Education Statistics). The 1997 reform that extended the compulsory school 
from 5 to 8 years, therefore, potentially affected close half of school age children at the junior 
high school level. By 2000-01 school year, four years after the law was enacted the net 
enrollment rate among males at the compulsory schooling stage (grades 1 to 8) increased to 
99,8 %. Although these official statistics on enrollment rates overestimate regular school 
attendance it is clear that the law increased schooling substantially for the cohorts affected by 
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the policy. This study contributes to the literature on returns to education by providing 
estimates from a developing country context where the set of compilers affected by the policy 
change was a large group similar to the Oreopoulos (2006) study. Even though there are 
previous studies that estimate the returns to schooling in Turkey (e.g. Tansel 1994, 1996), 
these studies do not address the endogeneity of the schooling variable, and, therefore, do not 
estimate its causal effect. This is the first study to estimate this causal effect using the 
compulsory schooling policy change in 1997. 
III. Data  
In the analysis we use Turkish Income and Expenditure Surveys (TIES) that are available 
annually from 2002 to 2010. TIES surveys are nationally representative, and include a rich set 
of information on earnings and hours of work, as well as information on education and a 
number of demographic characteristics. We restrict our analysis to men only because a low 
fraction of women are employed in Turkey. In this data, the age of respondents is grouped in 
intervals of five (15-19, 20-24, and so on). Therefore, we can know the year of birth also in 
five-year intervals only. The 1997 education reform affected children who were born at or 
after 1986. The members of the earliest birth-cohort affected by the policy, the 1986 birth-
cohort, were 24 years old in 2010—the latest year at which data are available. In other words, 
among the men that are affected by the education policy in our sample, the highest age is 24. 
Therefore, we restrict our analysis to 15- to 24-year-old men who report positive earnings at 
their current job or previous job(s) within the last year. Table 1 presents the structure of our 
data, which includes calendar years 2002 to 2010 and year-of-birth cohort intervals from 
1978-82 to 1991-95. The numbers in each cell in Table 1 indicates the sample size. The total 
sample includes 7,949 men aged 15 to 24. 
Ideally, we would account for the new education policy using a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 for individuals born at or after 1986 and 0 otherwise. However, 
since the birth-year variable is grouped in 5-year intervals, the education policy variable in 
our study can take values strictly between 0 and 1. The value of the education-policy variable 
by year-of-birth cohort-intervals is illustrated in Table 2. For the 1981-85 and earlier birth-
cohort intervals, the value of the policy variable is 0 because none of the birth-cohorts in these 
intervals is affected by the policy. Among the 1982-86 birth-cohorts, only the 1986 birth-
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cohort (one out of five) is affected by the policy; therefore, the value of the policy variable is 
0.2. Among the 1983-87 birth-cohorts, both 1986 and 1987 cohorts are affected, so the value 
of the policy variable is 0.4, and so on. For the 1986-90 and later birth-cohort intervals, the 
value of the policy variable is 1 because all birth cohorts in these intervals are affected by the 
policy. 
The information on education in TIES surveys is available in the form of completed 
degree. TIES also contains detailed information on earnings, as well as hours of work. TIES 
data do not include information on completed years of schooling, but includes information on 
the highest completed schooling degree (illiterate, literate but no degree, primary school [5 
years, old system], primary school [8 years, new system], secondary school, technical 
secondary school, high school, technical high school, 2-year college, 4-year college, Masters 
or Ph.D. degree). Therefore, we refer to the Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys—
which include information on both the completed degrees and completed years of schooling—
to learn about the distribution of years of schooling conditional on the highest completed 
schooling level. Using this information, we generate the mean years of schooling for each one 
of the highest completed schooling levels in the TIES2.  
In the TIES, earnings are reported at the annual level. For those who are employed at 
the time of the interview, there is information on cash earnings, in-kind earnings, as well as 
bonuses and premiums; the sum of these elements constitutes annual earnings in the primary 
job. The earnings information for self-employed people is in the form of cash earnings and in-
kind earnings only. For those who are not employed at the time of the interview but were 
employed for some time during the last year, there is information on cash and in-kind 
earnings from that job(s) during the last year, the sum of which give us annual earnings for 
                                               
2
 According to the 2008 wave of the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, the mean years of 
schooling for people with a certain degree would be well approximated by the minimum years of schooling 
required for that degree; in other words, 5 years for primary school degree, 8 years for secondary school degree, 
11 years for high school degree, 13 years for two-year college degree, 15 years for four-year college degree, 17 
years for Master’s degree. The average of years of schooling is very close to 0 for illiterate people, and close to 2 
years for those who are literate but have no degree. 
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these people. Agricultural earnings are ignored because the sample is restricted to residents in 
urban areas only. 
The variation across workers in annual earnings would reflect the differences in the 
hourly earnings—which is a measure of their productivity—as well as the number of hours 
they work within a year. The annual hours of work could differ across educational groups 
because more educated workers may be less likely to be employed at a given time or more 
likely to work for longer hours (Card [1999] provides evidence for the latter in the U.S. 
context.). Therefore, the primary measure of earnings that we are going to use in this study is 
earnings per hour. 
The number of months worked is available for all people who worked for some time 
within the last year. For workers who are employed at the time of the interview, this is the 
number of months worked in the current job; whereas, for workers who are unemployed at the 
time of interview, this is the number of months employed in the previous job(s) within the last 
year. When somebody is employed at the time of interview, but also had another job within 
the last year, only the number of months in the current job is available. (Therefore, 
accordingly, only annual earnings in the current job are taken in the earnings calculation.) The 
number of months is multiplied by 52/12 to find the annual number of weeks worked. 
TIES also includes information on the number of hours worked per week. Again, for 
those who are employed at the time of interview, this is for the current job; and, for those who 
are not employed at the time of interview, this is for the previous job within the last year. 
(There is also information on weekly hours of work and earnings from additional job(s); 
however, since there is no information on the number of months worked in this job(s), they 
are not included in the calculation of either annual earnings or annual hours of work.) 
The number of weeks worked is multiplied by the weekly hours of work to find the 
annual hours of work. Then, annual earnings are divided by annual hours of work to find 
hourly earnings. Hourly earnings (wages) at each year are adjusted to 2002 values, using the 
consumer price index for the month of July at each yearIn the estimation of the human capital 
earnings function, we will use the logarithm of hourly earnings due to the shape of the 
distribution of the hourly earnings variable. We also account for a number of family as well as 
employment characteristics of the male individuals in our sample. These include relation to 
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household head, marital status, type of employment, occupation, and sector of employment. 
The details of these variables are provided in the appendix. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample. The mean value of years of 
schooling in the sample is 8.4 years. Roughly one half of the people in the sample are affected 
by the new education policy. While 37 percent of the observations are aged 15 to 19, 63 
percent are aged 20 to 24. The mean value of tenure is 1.94 years. Most of the men in our 
sample (83.5 percent) are the sons of the household heads because most unmarried young men 
in these ages still live with their parents (as well as some married ones) in Turkey. The most 
common sectors of employment are manufacturing (31 percent), sales and repairs (25.6 
percent), and construction (9.3 percent).  
IV. Methodology 
We use the variation in the years of compulsory schooling across different birth 
cohorts to identify the causal impact of schooling on earnings. The expected value of years of 
schooling changes according to this discontunuity in the exposure to the policy across year-of-
birth cohorts. Moreover, the relationship between years of schooling and the covariate that 
determines the timing of the discontinuity (the forcing variable, which is year of birth) is 
continuous. Similary, there is a continuous relationship between the outcome variable (wages) 
and the forcing variable (year of birth), except for at the discontinuity. Therefore, the structure 
of our data fits a regression discontinuity design, where we can use the discontinuity in the 
exposure to the policy as an instrumental variable for years of schooling. 3 In particular, we 
estimate the following set of equations using two-stage least squares: 
,)(log iiiiiii ZYASxfw ηγβαρ +++++=     (1) 
,)( iiiiiii ZYADxfS ξγβαpi +++++=     (2) 
                                               
3
 Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide a review of regression-discontinuity design. Hahn et al. (2001) 
construct a theoretical framework for regression-discontunity design, and Angrist and Lavy (1999) and van der 
Klaauw (2002) are examples to some of the earliest applications. Oreopoulos (2006) uses regression-
discontinuity design in his analysis of the effects of compulsory schooling laws on earnings in the UK. 
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where w denotes wages, S schooling, A age, Y calendar year, and Z control variables; and f(.) 
stands for continuous relationship between the outcome variables and x, the forcing variable 
(year of birth). In equation (1), ρ is the causal effect of schooling on wages and η  is the error 
term. In equation (2), pi  is the causal effect of the education policy on years of schooling, iD  
refers to the treatment variable, and ξ  is the error term. We also estimate a reduced form of 
equation (1), given by 
.)(log iiiiiii ZYADxfw ηγβασ +++++=     (3) 
As explained in the data section, the value of the treatment variable depends on the 
forcing variable as follows: 

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Di .     (4) 
A critical aspect of any regression discontinuity design is to distinguish the effect of 
this discontinous jump, D, from the smooth function, f(.), in year-of-birth. Ideally, one would 
like to use a very flexible functional form for f(.); however, since the discontinous jump in our 
data is distributed over a few years, a very flexible f(.) could partly capture the effect of the 
policy around the discontinuity. Moreover, since the number of year-of-birth groups that we 
have in the estimation is relatively few (14 groups as can be seen in Table 1), disentengaling 
the effect of the policy from a very flexible underlying relationship between year-of-birth and 
the outcome variables would be difficult. Therefore, we use only linear and quadratic 
functions of year of birth in the estimation. 
Since the sample includes only 15- to 24-year-old men and age is grouped in five-year 
intervals, equations (1) and (2) include a dummy variable for the 20- to 24-year-old age 
group. We use data from 9 different calendar years (2002 to 2010); therefore, equations (1) 
and (2) also inlcude calendar year dummies. However, for identification reasons, both 2002 
and 2003 dummies are omitted as the baseline category. Standard errors are clustered at the 
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level of birth-year groups because the policy variable does not exhibit variation across 
individuals within a birth-year group. 
In an alternative specification, we add tenure to equation (1) as follows: 
,)()(log iiiiiiii eZYTgASxfw ++++++= γβαρ     (5) 
where T denotes tenure, g(.) is the functional form of tenure, and e the error term.  
The validity of the instrument requires that the value of the instrument is randomly 
distributed so that the treatment and control groups are on average the same in terms of pre-
treatment characteristics. This is quite acceptable in this study as the value of the instrument 
depends on the year-of-birth, and neigbouring year-of-birth cohorts would on average be the 
same. The exclusion restriction assumption requires that the instrument has no direct on 
wages, apart from its indirect effect through schooling. In our context, there is no reason to 
think about the effect of the policy on wages because the timing of the policy was very much 
independent of the economic conditions. The timing of the event was related to the political 
conditions of the time.  
V. Results 
V.I Preliminary analysis 
Figure 1 illustrates how the log hourly wage rate changes over the life-cycle by 
educational attainment using the 2005 wave of TIES. There are substantial differences in 
wages across educational groups; for instance, among the 30 to 34 year old age group, college 
graduates earn roughly twice as much as and high school graduates earn roughly 50 percent 
more than primary school and secondary school graduates. The other key difference is in the 
shape of the age-earnings profiles of education groups. The profiles of groups with lower 
educational attainment are flatter, in particular, that of men with no degrees. On the other 
hand, among younger age-groups, wages rise much faster for men with college degrees. 
A key assumption made in Mincer’s human capital earnings function is that the log 
hourly wage rate is linear in years of schooling; in other words, every additional year of 
schooling makes the same percentage change in hourly wage rate, regardless of completed 
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years of schooling. Card (1999) assesses the validity of this assumption in the U.S. context, 
and finds that this is in fact a reasonable assumption. Figure 2 shows how mean log hourly 
wages change with completed years of schooling, in order to test this assumption in the 
Turkish context. After 8 years of schooling, the relationship between log hourly wages and 
years of schooling is very close to being linear. However, before 8 years of schooling, the 
relationship is much less linear; in fact, there is little differences between the log hourly 
wages for primary school and secondary school graduates according to the 2005 wave of 
TIES. 
Table 4 displays the relationship between education (years of schooling) and earnings 
(measured as log annual earnings and log hourly earnings), as well as the relationship between 
education and hours of work (measured as log annual hours, months worked, and log weekly 
hours). According to these OLS estimates based on the 2005 wave of TIES, an extra year of 
schooling is associated with a 10.2 percent increase in annual earnings and a 9.6 percent 
increase in hourly earnings. The changes in annual earnings and hourly earnings are very 
similar in the Turkish case because there is a weak relationship between education and annual 
hours of work; an extra year of schooling is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in the 
annual hours work. (The same increase for the U.S. is estimated as 4.2 percent by Card 
[1999].) However, column (4) in Table 1 shows that educated men work, on average, for a 
higher number of months. This indicates that men with lower levels of education are much 
more likely to be unemployed. On the other hand, column (5) of Table 1 shows that once 
employed, men with lower educational attainment work for longer hours; there is a negative 
relationship between years of schooling and weekly hours of work. This last finding is in stark 
contrast to the finding for the U.S. (Card, 1999) where there is a positive association between 
education and weekly hours of work. 
V.II Estimation results 
Table 5 presents the estimation results using pooled TIES data for the specification 
with a linear functional form for year-of-birth. In column (1), the estimates for the first stage 
of the 2SLS estimation, shown by equation (2) earlier, are given. According to these 
estimates, the education policy increases schooling by 0.61 years. It is more complicated to 
interpret age, year-of-birth, and calendar year effects because for instance, holding age 
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constant, increasing year-of-birth by one also increases the calendar year by one as well. In 
column (2), the estimates for the reduced form wage equation, shown by equation (3) earlier, 
are given. These estimates suggest that, the new education policy increases the wage rate by 
18 percent. In column (3), the OLS estimation results of the main wage equation—equation 
(1)—are displayed. The returns to schooling according to the OLS estimates are relatively 
low: an additional year of education increases wages by about 3 percent. Finally, column (4) 
displays our main results: 2SLS estimates. The returns to schooling estimates from the 2SLS 
estimation are substantially higher: an additional year of schooling increases wages by 30 
percent.  
The specification used in the estimates displayed in Table 6 allows for a more flexible 
functional form for year of birth; it is quadratic. According to these estimates, the new 
education policy increases schooling by about one complete year. As a result of increasing the 
school leaving age by one year, Oreopoulos (2006) reports that schooling increases by about 
0.35 to 0.45 years in the UK context while Pischke and von Wachter (2008) report an increase 
of 0.28 years among basic school students in Germany. In the Turkish context, where 
compulsory schooling increased by three years, the resulting schooling increase corresponds 
to about 0.33 year increase per one year increase in compulsory schooling. Thus the 
magnitude of the increase in schooling in this context is in line with results reported for other 
countries. The OLS estimate for returns to schooling is very similar to that in Table 5; an 
additional year of schooling increases earnings by about 3 percent. However, the 2SLS 
estimate of returns to schooling, with a quadratic functional form for year of birth, is lower: 
an additional year of schooling increases wages by about 20 percent. 
The fact that the 2SLS estimates of the returns to schooling change significantly 
according to the functional form of the forcing variable reflect the limitation of our data set in 
the way that the time span of our data is relatively short. However, we find the estimates with 
the quadratic time trend more reliable because the estimate of the impact of the education 
policy on years of schooling—that the education policy increases schooling by about one year 
for men—is in accordance with the findings of Kirdar et al. (2013), who analyze the impact of 
the same education policy on years of schooling with a much longer time frame of data using 
the Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys. 
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The results of the estimation of equation (4), which accounts for tenure, are given in 
Table 7 (which includes a linear functional form for year-of-birth) and Table 8 (which 
includes a quadratic functional form for year-of-birth). In the specification with tenure, 
accounting for year-of-birth with a linear or a quadratic functional form makes little 
difference in both OLS and 2SLS estimation of the wage equation. According to the OLS 
estimates, an extra year of schooling increases wages by 3.6 percent, whereas according to the 
2SLS estimates, an extra year of schooling increases wages by 17 percent. 
It is not surprising that in the specifications that control for tenure, the estimated 
returns to education are smaller because, otherwise, education captures also the effect of 
tenure. However, it is not clear which specification is to be preferred because tenure is itself 
endogenous and affected by education. In other words, giving a person an extra year of 
schooling would also change his/her tenure level at a certain level of age. 
An important concern about our identification strategy is that the education policy 
could also change the employment patterns of the 15- to 24-year-olds, as well as their wages. 
For instance, if the education reform induced an individual to stay in high school – who would 
otherwise work – the education reform would also change the composition of the people 
before and after the policy whose wages we compare. To investigate this possibility, we ran a 
regression of employment status on the policy dummy variable as well as a number of control 
variables including a quadratic year of birth time trend, age group dummy variable, calendar 
year dummies, relationship to the household head and relationship status. The results of this 
regression are presented in Table 9. In panel (a), the sample includes all 15- to 24-year-olds, 
whereas in panel (b) the sample is restricted to 20- to 24-year-olds only. As can be seen from 
the table, the education reform has a negative effect on employment probability for both 
samples. In panel (a), for the total sample of 15- to 24-year-olds, the education policy 
decreases the employment probability by almost 6 percentage points. 
VI. Conclusion  
This study estimated the causal effect of education on wages in Turkey. For this 
purpose, we exploited the exogenous change in schooling outcomes as a result of the 
education policy reform in 1997, which extended the duration of compulsory schooling from 
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five to eight years. A regression-discontinuity design is conducted to identify the effect of this 
exogenous change in years of schooling on wages. We employed a number of alternative 
empirical specifications, in particular with respect to the polynomial form the year-of-birth 
time trend, to disentangle the effect of the education policy from the secular time trend in 
wages. 
We find that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the returns to schooling is 
0.035; in other words, an extra year of schooling increases wages by 3.5 percent in Turkey. 
However, the two-stage-least-squares estimate is much higher: according to this, an extra year 
of schooling increases wages by 17 percent in Turkey. This estimate for Turkey is higher than 
those estimated for the US or the UK. In a developing country context – where capital is 
relatively scarce – we would expect the returns to schooling to be higher. Moreover, while the 
“compliers” – those who are induced to change their behavior by the instrument – in the 
studies using compulsory schooling laws in the U.S. (e.g., Angrist and Krueger [1991]) are 
likely to come from the lower end of the ability distribution (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000), 
the compliers in our study are much more representative of the total population due to the 
high drop-out rates after compulsory schooling in Turkey (Kırdar et al., 2013). Hence, the 
compliers in our sample could face higher returns to schooling. 
Since the compliers in our study are much more representative of the total population, 
our LATE is close to the ATE – as in the case of Oreopoulos (2006). Assuming a linear 
relationship between log wage and schooling, this allows us to compare the OLS and 2SLS 
estimates without much concern about the representativeness of the compliers. That the 2SLS 
estimate is much higher than the OLS estimate points out to an acute endogeneity problem in 
the OLS estimate of the returns to schooling. This suggests that the measurement error bias – 
which would attenuate the OLS estimate of returns to schooling – is likely to be very 
important in the Turkish setting whereas the omitted variable bias – which would inflate the 
OLS estimate – is not very important. That the omitted variable bias is not important in the 
Turkish setting is very plausible because school attendance, as well as success in school, in 
Turkey is more of a result of opportunities than a result of ability – compared to those in 
Western countries. 
16 
 
Another interesting feature of the experiment in our study is that it changes schooling 
behavior in a wide range of schooling levels. Since the duration of the extension is three 
years, it affects behavior in the 6th, 7th and 8th grades. In addition, strong spillover effects of 
the policy on high school grade levels are reported (Kırdar et al., 2013) – which means that 
the policy affects schooling behavior in high school grade levels (9th, 10th and 11th grades) as 
well. This implies that our estimate of the returns to schooling is an average of the returns to 
schooling in various grade levels. Therefore, to the degree that there are non-linearities in the 
wage-schooling locus, it is easier to interpret our estimate of the returns to schooling as the 
effect of an additional year of schooling on wages than the estimates in the US or UK setting 
(see, e.g., Angrist and Krueger [1991] and Oreopoulos [2006]) where the returns to schooling 
are estimated at certain age levels – which may be quite different from the returns to 
schooling at other ages. 
At the same time, there are important limitations of our analysis due to data 
limitations. The oldest birth-cohort that is affected by the new policy was 24 years old in 
2010, the latest year in our data. Therefore, we need to restrict our analysis to 15- to 24-year-
olds. However, for this age group, the education reform affected wages also through its effect 
on employment outcomes. Our analysis also reveals that the education reform decreased the 
employment probability for this age group, and therefore the occurrence of positive wages. 
This could potentially cause an important bias in our estimates.  
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Figure 1: Hourly Wage Profiles for Men (TIES, 2005) 
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Figure 2: Relationship between Mean Log Hourly Wages and Years of Education (Men Aged 
30-49 in TIES, 2005) 
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Table 1: Structure of Data: Year-of-Birth Groups vs. Calendar Year 
 
 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Year of Birth
1978-82 637 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 637
1979-83 0 1,141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,141
1980-84 0 0 410 0 0 0 0 0 0 410
1981-85 0 0 0 424 0 0 0 0 0 424
1982-86 0 0 0 0 430 0 0 0 0 430
1983-87 407 0 0 0 0 453 0 0 0 860
1984-88 0 570 0 0 0 0 430 0 0 1,000
1985-89 0 0 194 0 0 0 0 542 0 736
1986-90 0 0 0 256 0 0 0 0 538 794
1987-91 0 0 0 0 250 0 0 0 0 250
1988-92 0 0 0 0 0 241 0 0 0 241
1989-93 0 0 0 0 0 0 283 0 0 283
1990-94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 332 0 332
1991-95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 411 411
Total 1,044 1,711 604 680 680 694 713 874 949 7,949
Notes: The sample includes 15- to 24-year-old men for whom wage data are available.
Year
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Table 2: Value of the Policy Variable over Birth-Year Cohorts 
 
  
 
  
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Total
Year of Birth
1978-82 637 0 0 0 0 0 637
1979-83 1,141 0 0 0 0 0 1,141
1980-84 410 0 0 0 0 0 410
1981-85 424 0 0 0 0 0 424
1982-86 0 430 0 0 0 0 430
1983-87 0 0 860 0 0 0 860
1984-88 0 0 0 1,000 0 0 1,000
1985-89 0 0 0 0 736 0 736
1986-90 0 0 0 0 0 794 794
1987-91 0 0 0 0 0 250 250
1988-92 0 0 0 0 0 241 241
1989-93 0 0 0 0 0 283 283
1990-94 0 0 0 0 0 332 332
1991-95 0 0 0 0 0 411 411
Total 2,612 430 860 1,000 736 2,311 7,949
Notes: The sample includes 15- to 24-year-old men for whom wage data are available.
Value of "Policy" Variable
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Log (Wage) -0.063 0.784 -8.450 4.810 7949
Years of Education 8.392 3.074 0 17 7949
Education Policy 0.494 0.413 0 1 7949
Age Group
15-19 0.370 0.483 0 1 7949
20-24 0.630 0.483 0 1 7949
Tenure 1.942 2.237 0 16 7146
Calendar Year
2002 0.131 0.338 0 1 7949
2003 0.215 0.411 0 1 7949
2004 0.076 0.265 0 1 7949
2005 0.086 0.280 0 1 7949
2006 0.086 0.280 0 1 7949
2007 0.087 0.282 0 1 7949
2008 0.090 0.286 0 1 7949
2009 0.110 0.313 0 1 7949
2010 0.119 0.324 0 1 7949
Relationship to Household Head
Household Head 0.093 0.290 0 1 7949
Son of Household Head 0.835 0.372 0 1 7949
Other 0.073 0.260 0 1 7949
Relatioship Status
Partnered 0.154 0.361 0 1 7949
Single 0.846 0.361 0 1 7949
Employment Type
Salary-earner 0.805 0.397 0 1 7949
Wage-earner 0.136 0.343 0 1 7949
Business-owner 0.013 0.111 0 1 7949
Self-employed 0.046 0.210 0 1 7949
Type of Occupation
Upper-level Administrative 0.034 0.181 0 1 7949
Professional 0.027 0.163 0 1 7949
Assistant Professional 0.057 0.231 0 1 7949
Office and Customer Services 0.063 0.243 0 1 7949
Services and Sales Workers 0.250 0.433 0 1 7949
Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Forestry 0.002 0.046 0 1 7949
Artisans 0.301 0.459 0 1 7949
Technicians/Operators 0.104 0.305 0 1 7949
Unskilled Workers 0.161 0.367 0 1 7949
Sector of Employment
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.022 0.147 0 1 7949
Mining 0.004 0.061 0 1 7949
Manufacturing 0.309 0.462 0 1 7949
Electricity, Gas, and Water Services 0.003 0.054 0 1 7949
Construction 0.093 0.291 0 1 7949
Sales, Repairs 0.256 0.437 0 1 7949
Hotels and Restaurants 0.086 0.280 0 1 7949
Shipping, Telecommunications 0.059 0.235 0 1 7949
Financial Services 0.006 0.075 0 1 7949
Real Estate Businesses 0.050 0.217 0 1 7949
Public Administration, Defense 0.013 0.112 0 1 7949
Education 0.011 0.106 0 1 7949
Health, Social Services 0.089 0.284 0 1 7949
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Table 4: Relationship of Education with Annual and Hourly Earnings, Annual and 
Weekly Hours of Work, and Months Worked (TIES, 2005) 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable
Log Annual 
Earnings
Log Hourly 
Earnings
Log Annual 
Hours
Months 
Worked 
Log Weekly 
Hours
Education Coefficients 0.102*** 0.096*** 0.005* 0.140*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
No. obs 5040 5014 5108 5136 5136
R-Squared 0.246 0.224 0.040 0.093 0.017
Notes: Education is measured as years of schooling. The education coefficients come from regressions of the dependent 
variables on a linear education term, as well as a cubic polynomial of potential experience (age-years of schooling-6). Samples 
include 15 to 64 year old men. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results with a Linear Time Trend for Year of Birth 
 
Continued next page 
OLS 2SLS
Years of 
Education Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Education 0.0304*** 0.301***
[0.00395] [0.0814]
Policy Dummy 0.608*** 0.183***
[0.128] [0.0317]
Year of Birth Cohort Trend 0.315*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.102***
[0.0962] [0.0252] [0.0328] [0.0366]
Age Effects (Baseline: 15-19 age group)
20-24 age group 2.674*** 1.491*** 1.387*** 0.687***
[0.496] [0.129] [0.163] [0.231]
Year Effects (Baseline: 2002, 2003)
2004 -0.129 -0.114** -0.111** -0.0749
[0.181] [0.0427] [0.0512] [0.0593]
2005 -0.637** -0.214*** -0.193** -0.0228
[0.221] [0.0643] [0.0837] [0.0953]
2006 -0.854** -0.468*** -0.432*** -0.211*
[0.325] [0.0902] [0.117] [0.122]
2007 -1.199** -0.613*** -0.557*** -0.252
[0.488] [0.133] [0.165] [0.155]
2008 -1.370** -0.978*** -0.909*** -0.567***
[0.503] [0.142] [0.178] [0.174]
2009 -1.691** -1.107*** -1.019*** -0.599***
[0.618] [0.168] [0.216] [0.219]
2010 -2.264*** -1.301*** -1.191*** -0.620**
[0.717] [0.194] [0.248] [0.262]
Relation to Household Head (Baseline: Other)
Household Head 0.406*** 0.101** 0.0897** -0.0207
[0.131] [0.0337] [0.0321] [0.0470]
Son of Household Head 0.305** -0.0956*** -0.106*** -0.187***
[0.119] [0.0205] [0.0206] [0.0516]
Relationship Status (Baseline: Single)
Partnered -1.070*** 0.00818 0.0385 0.330***
[0.101] [0.0238] [0.0242] [0.0945]
Type of Employment (Baseline: Salary Earner)
Wage Earner -0.927*** -0.0591 -0.0322 0.219***
[0.0907] [0.0348] [0.0355] [0.0843]
Business Owner -0.721** 0.720*** 0.742*** 0.937***
[0.287] [0.0736] [0.0766] [0.125]
Self-Employed -0.840*** 0.117* 0.143** 0.370***
[0.214] [0.0655] [0.0646] [0.0868]
Reduced Form
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Table 5, cont’d 
Occupation (Baseline: Upper-level administrative)
Professional 2.056*** 0.432*** 0.371*** -0.186
[0.420] [0.0895] [0.0968] [0.273]
Assistant Professional 0.455* 0.0297 0.0166 -0.107
[0.252] [0.0800] [0.0836] [0.137]
Office and Customer Services 0.0918 -0.125 -0.127 -0.153
[0.246] [0.0892] [0.0915] [0.128]
Services and Sales Workers -1.104*** -0.313*** -0.279*** 0.0191
[0.205] [0.0869] [0.0877] [0.118]
Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Forestry -0.597 -0.188 -0.182 -0.00831
[0.542] [0.282] [0.281] [0.307]
Artisans -2.203*** -0.294*** -0.225** 0.369*
[0.207] [0.0823] [0.0844] [0.195]
Technicians/Operators -1.813*** -0.144* -0.0895 0.400**
[0.250] [0.0810] [0.0851] [0.179]
Unskilled Workers -2.178*** -0.329*** -0.263** 0.326*
[0.176] [0.0896] [0.0892] [0.186]
Sector of Employment (Baseline: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing)
Mining 0.0667 0.368 0.359 0.348
[0.800] [0.247] [0.245] [0.294]
Manufacturing 0.469 0.157** 0.135** 0.0159
[0.301] [0.0522] [0.0475] [0.0858]
Electricity, Gas, and Water Services 1.583** 0.288 0.239 -0.187
[0.581] [0.172] [0.168] [0.192]
Construction 0.914*** 0.126** 0.0895* -0.149
[0.288] [0.0542] [0.0487] [0.106]
Sales, Repairs 0.620** -0.0631 -0.0898 -0.249***
[0.271] [0.0621] [0.0571] [0.0835]
Hotels and Restaurants 0.231 0.0389 0.0256 -0.0306
[0.309] [0.0630] [0.0583] [0.0813]
Shipping, Telecommunications 0.715** 0.0500 0.0188 -0.165
[0.287] [0.0858] [0.0825] [0.107]
Financial Services 1.946*** 0.251** 0.186* -0.334*
[0.511] [0.112] [0.105] [0.183]
Real Estate Businesses 1.336*** -0.0160 -0.0649 -0.417***
[0.371] [0.0671] [0.0623] [0.157]
Public Administration, Defense 1.790*** 0.621*** 0.562*** 0.0836
[0.488] [0.104] [0.104] [0.240]
Education 2.503*** 0.332*** 0.250** -0.421
[0.369] [0.108] [0.109] [0.281]
Health, Social Services -0.0725 -0.199** -0.204** -0.177**
[0.260] [0.0761] [0.0734] [0.0770]
Constant 4.467*** -2.622*** -2.804*** -3.964***
[1.257] [0.332] [0.402] [0.509]
Number of Observations 7,949 7,949 7,949 7,949
R-squared 0.230 0.242 0.252 -0.614
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Estimation Results with a Quadratic Time Trend for Year of Birth 
 
Continued next page. 
OLS 2SLS
Years of 
Education Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Education 0.0304*** 0.200***
[0.00397] [0.0471]
Policy Dummy 1.004*** 0.201***
[0.0962] [0.0505]
Year of Birth Cohort Trend 0.154*** 0.189*** 0.215*** 0.158***
[0.0280] [0.0273] [0.0371] [0.0300]
Year of Birth Cohort Trend Squared 0.00715*** 0.000322 -0.000894 -0.00111**
[0.000842] [0.000615] [0.000635] [0.000464]
Age Effects (Baseline: 15-19 age group)
20-24 age group 2.945*** 1.503*** 1.360*** 0.915***
[0.101] [0.123] [0.196] [0.154]
Year Effects (Baseline: 2002, 2003)
2004 -0.127 -0.114** -0.111** -0.0882**
[0.131] [0.0442] [0.0463] [0.0380]
2005 -0.651*** -0.215*** -0.192** -0.0847
[0.0495] [0.0654] [0.0827] [0.0674]
2006 -0.919*** -0.471*** -0.427*** -0.287***
[0.0676] [0.0892] [0.123] [0.0900]
2007 -1.327*** -0.618*** -0.547** -0.353***
[0.0925] [0.128] [0.182] [0.120]
2008 -1.585*** -0.988*** -0.891*** -0.671***
[0.142] [0.138] [0.198] [0.134]
2009 -1.997*** -1.120*** -0.992*** -0.722***
[0.142] [0.165] [0.237] [0.165]
2010 -2.685*** -1.320*** -1.151*** -0.783***
[0.165] [0.191] [0.277] [0.197]
Relation to Household Head (Baseline: Other)
Household Head 0.397** 0.101*** 0.0907** 0.0217
[0.132] [0.0334] [0.0317] [0.0337]
Son of Household Head 0.303** -0.0957*** -0.105*** -0.156***
[0.119] [0.0204] [0.0206] [0.0332]
Relationship Status (Baseline: Single)
Partnered -1.076*** 0.00791 0.0399 0.223***
[0.101] [0.0237] [0.0243] [0.0637]
Type of Employment (Baseline: Salary Earner)
Wage Earner -0.921*** -0.0588 -0.0326 0.125**
[0.0905] [0.0346] [0.0354] [0.0531]
Business Owner -0.739** 0.719*** 0.744*** 0.867***
[0.289] [0.0727] [0.0763] [0.113]
Self-Employed -0.837*** 0.118* 0.143** 0.285***
[0.215] [0.0656] [0.0648] [0.0878]
Reduced Form
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Table 6, cont’d
 
Occupation (Baseline: Upper-level administrative)
Professional 2.056*** 0.432*** 0.370*** 0.0213
[0.421] [0.0895] [0.0969] [0.149]
Assistant Professional 0.451* 0.0296 0.0168 -0.0606
[0.253] [0.0798] [0.0837] [0.104]
Office and Customer Services 0.0857 -0.126 -0.127 -0.143
[0.247] [0.0888] [0.0917] [0.108]
Services and Sales Workers -1.109*** -0.313*** -0.279*** -0.0914
[0.206] [0.0865] [0.0877] [0.128]
Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Forestry -0.616 -0.189 -0.176 -0.0656
[0.544] [0.281] [0.282] [0.297]
Artisans -2.209*** -0.294*** -0.225** 0.147
[0.207] [0.0820] [0.0845] [0.171]
Technicians/Operators -1.821*** -0.145* -0.0883 0.219
[0.253] [0.0805] [0.0850] [0.167]
Unskilled Workers -2.185*** -0.329*** -0.262** 0.107
[0.176] [0.0892] [0.0890] [0.165]
Sector of Employment (Baseline: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing)
Mining 0.0727 0.369 0.361 0.354
[0.790] [0.247] [0.244] [0.255]
Manufacturing 0.486 0.158*** 0.135** 0.0605
[0.303] [0.0522] [0.0472] [0.0598]
Electricity, Gas, and Water Services 1.590** 0.289 0.238 -0.0289
[0.581] [0.172] [0.168] [0.181]
Construction 0.925*** 0.126** 0.0906* -0.0588
[0.289] [0.0544] [0.0481] [0.0651]
Sales, Repairs 0.633** -0.0625 -0.0892 -0.189***
[0.273] [0.0619] [0.0569] [0.0654]
Hotels and Restaurants 0.249 0.0397 0.0253 -0.0100
[0.309] [0.0628] [0.0582] [0.0581]
Shipping, Telecommunications 0.721** 0.0503 0.0209 -0.0938
[0.288] [0.0858] [0.0816] [0.0818]
Financial Services 1.971*** 0.252** 0.185 -0.141
[0.511] [0.112] [0.104] [0.134]
Real Estate Businesses 1.357*** -0.0150 -0.0651 -0.286**
[0.374] [0.0668] [0.0623] [0.112]
Public Administration, Defense 1.803*** 0.622*** 0.562*** 0.262
[0.491] [0.104] [0.104] [0.170]
Education 2.506*** 0.332*** 0.251** -0.169
[0.370] [0.108] [0.109] [0.193]
Health, Social Services -0.0599 -0.198** -0.204** -0.186***
[0.261] [0.0764] [0.0729] [0.0684]
Constant 5.018*** -2.597*** -2.859*** -3.600***
[0.417] [0.307] [0.449] [0.391]
Observations 7,949 7,949 7,949 7,949
R-squared 0.231 0.242 0.252 -0.088
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Estimation Results with Tenure and a Linear Time Trend for Year of Birth 
Continued next page. 
OLS 2SLS
Years of 
Education Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Education 0.0356*** 0.169***
[0.00350] [0.0530]
Policy Dummy 0.783*** 0.133***
[0.147] [0.0365]
Tenure -0.252*** 0.0355*** 0.0445*** 0.0780***
[0.0398] [0.00549] [0.00577] [0.0182]
Tenure Squared 0.00686 -0.00264*** -0.00290*** -0.00380***
[0.00398] [0.000434] [0.000467] [0.000986]
Year of Birth Cohort Trend 0.357*** 0.176*** 0.171*** 0.115***
[0.0653] [0.0232] [0.0274] [0.0232]
Age Effects (Baseline: 15-19 age group)
20-24 age group 3.074*** 1.354*** 1.229*** 0.834***
[0.340] [0.123] [0.140] [0.154]
Year Effects (Baseline: 2002, 2003)
2004 -0.261* -0.108*** -0.0996** -0.0635**
[0.137] [0.0287] [0.0336] [0.0273]
2005 -0.799*** -0.167*** -0.138** -0.0316
[0.148] [0.0517] [0.0584] [0.0528]
2006 -1.106*** -0.352*** -0.307*** -0.165**
[0.224] [0.0756] [0.0887] [0.0665]
2007 -1.456*** -0.482*** -0.419** -0.236**
[0.371] [0.129] [0.141] [0.0940]
2008 -1.853*** -0.805*** -0.722*** -0.491***
[0.354] [0.123] [0.139] [0.105]
2009 -2.203*** -0.884*** -0.782*** -0.511***
[0.425] [0.146] [0.168] [0.126]
2010 -2.760*** -1.040*** -0.914*** -0.573***
[0.500] [0.173] [0.196] [0.156]
Relation to Household Head (Baseline: Other)
Household Head 0.452*** 0.126*** 0.111*** 0.0491
[0.147] [0.0282] [0.0259] [0.0396]
Son of Household Head 0.327*** -0.0799*** -0.0918*** -0.135***
[0.101] [0.0218] [0.0203] [0.0305]
Relationship Status (Baseline: Single)
Partnered -0.933*** -0.00490 0.0272 0.153***
[0.0933] [0.0202] [0.0210] [0.0587]
Type of Employment (Baseline: Salary Earner)
Wage Earner -0.820*** -0.0888** -0.0598 0.0500
[0.0963] [0.0331] [0.0339] [0.0652]
Business Owner -0.607* 0.704*** 0.726*** 0.807***
[0.321] [0.0731] [0.0784] [0.0964]
Self-Employed -0.617*** 0.0757 0.0976 0.180**
[0.203] [0.0661] [0.0656] [0.0745]
Reduced Form
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Table 7, cont’d
 
Occupation (Baseline: Upper-level administrative)
Professional 2.381*** 0.513*** 0.429*** 0.110
[0.403] [0.0828] [0.0971] [0.198]
Assistant Professional 0.578* 0.000866 -0.0194 -0.0969
[0.284] [0.0708] [0.0763] [0.105]
Office and Customer Services 0.260 -0.0861 -0.0948 -0.130
[0.270] [0.0921] [0.0970] [0.117]
Services and Sales Workers -1.006*** -0.340*** -0.304*** -0.170
[0.256] [0.0870] [0.0894] [0.114]
Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Forestry -1.116 -0.324 -0.295 -0.135
[0.685] [0.315] [0.316] [0.314]
Artisans -2.000*** -0.326*** -0.254*** 0.0124
[0.257] [0.0828] [0.0841] [0.150]
Technicians/Operators -1.676*** -0.178** -0.118 0.106
[0.293] [0.0812] [0.0867] [0.150]
Unskilled Workers -2.152*** -0.343*** -0.266** 0.0211
[0.220] [0.0904] [0.0907] [0.157]
Sector of Employment (Baseline: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing)
Mining -0.461 0.407 0.423 0.485*
[0.802] [0.264] [0.258] [0.263]
Manufacturing -0.0214 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.220***
[0.265] [0.0600] [0.0540] [0.0423]
Electricity, Gas, and Water Services 1.053 0.391** 0.356** 0.213
[0.739] [0.154] [0.152] [0.163]
Construction 0.438* 0.157** 0.139** 0.0832*
[0.208] [0.0678] [0.0624] [0.0474]
Sales, Repairs 0.176 -0.0192 -0.0270 -0.0490
[0.234] [0.0674] [0.0620] [0.0459]
Hotels and Restaurants -0.375 0.0728 0.0852 0.136**
[0.271] [0.0805] [0.0741] [0.0667]
Shipping, Telecommunications 0.216 0.156* 0.146* 0.120*
[0.234] [0.0780] [0.0745] [0.0630]
Financial Services 1.060** 0.149 0.112 -0.0303
[0.436] [0.180] [0.169] [0.111]
Real Estate Businesses 0.954*** 0.00968 -0.0261 -0.152**
[0.304] [0.0792] [0.0724] [0.0654]
Public Administration, Defense 1.310** 0.502*** 0.454*** 0.281**
[0.525] [0.133] [0.122] [0.111]
Education 1.593*** 0.230 0.171 -0.0392
[0.401] [0.131] [0.119] [0.0945]
Health, Social Services -0.359 -0.119 -0.107 -0.0579
[0.206] [0.0716] [0.0689] [0.0607]
Constant 6.349*** -1.570*** -1.791*** -2.644***
[0.555] [0.217] [0.231] [0.415]
Number of Observations 7,146 7,146 7,146 7,146
R-squared 0.247 0.272 0.287 0.063
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Estimation Results with Tenure and a Quadratic Time Trend for Birth Year 
 
Continued on next page 
OLS 2SLS
Years of 
Education Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Education 0.0356*** 0.170***
[0.00350] [0.0446]
Policy Dummy 1.050*** 0.179***
[0.145] [0.0548]
Tenure -0.250*** 0.0358*** 0.0445*** 0.0784***
[0.0395] [0.00555] [0.00576] [0.0162]
Tenure Squared 0.00677 -0.00266*** -0.00290*** -0.00381***
[0.00397] [0.000432] [0.000464] [0.000944]
Year of Birth Cohort Trend 0.293*** 0.165*** 0.171*** 0.115***
[0.0217] [0.0168] [0.0268] [0.0211]
Year of Birth Cohort Trend Squared 0.00523*** 0.000911 -2.37e-05 2.03e-05
[0.00131] [0.000577] [0.000584] [0.000464]
Age Effects (Baseline: 15-19 age group)
20-24 age group 3.259*** 1.387*** 1.229*** 0.831***
[0.0906] [0.0873] [0.146] [0.132]
Year Effects (Baseline: 2002, 2003)
2004 -0.259** -0.107*** -0.0996** -0.0632**
[0.110] [0.0285] [0.0336] [0.0271]
2005 -0.808*** -0.168*** -0.138** -0.0306
[0.0646] [0.0478] [0.0588] [0.0497]
2006 -1.150*** -0.359*** -0.307*** -0.163***
[0.0590] [0.0611] [0.0898] [0.0622]
2007 -1.545*** -0.498*** -0.418** -0.234***
[0.104] [0.0994] [0.143] [0.0870]
2008 -2.003*** -0.831*** -0.721*** -0.490***
[0.161] [0.0930] [0.143] [0.0937]
2009 -2.417*** -0.921*** -0.781*** -0.509***
[0.124] [0.116] [0.173] [0.116]
2010 -3.056*** -1.091*** -0.913*** -0.570***
[0.181] [0.135] [0.205] [0.143]
Relation to Household Head (Baseline: Other)
Household Head 0.447*** 0.125*** 0.111*** 0.0485
[0.147] [0.0283] [0.0258] [0.0368]
Son of Household Head 0.327*** -0.0800*** -0.0918*** -0.136***
[0.100] [0.0218] [0.0203] [0.0286]
Relationship Status (Baseline: Single)
Partnered -0.937*** -0.00572 0.0272 0.154***
[0.0933] [0.0201] [0.0210] [0.0532]
Reduced Form
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Table 8, cont’d
Type of Employment (Baseline: Salary Earner)
Wage Earner -0.815*** -0.0878** -0.0598 0.0511
[0.0955] [0.0332] [0.0340] [0.0585]
Business Owner -0.619* 0.702*** 0.726*** 0.808***
[0.323] [0.0721] [0.0779] [0.104]
Self-Employed -0.616*** 0.0759 0.0976 0.181**
[0.204] [0.0661] [0.0656] [0.0804]
Occupation (Baseline: Upper-level administrative)
Professional 2.383*** 0.513*** 0.429*** 0.107
[0.403] [0.0828] [0.0973] [0.163]
Assistant Professional 0.577* 0.000647 -0.0194 -0.0977
[0.284] [0.0706] [0.0763] [0.0967]
Office and Customer Services 0.258 -0.0865 -0.0948 -0.130
[0.270] [0.0918] [0.0970] [0.114]
Services and Sales Workers -1.008*** -0.340*** -0.304*** -0.168
[0.257] [0.0866] [0.0893] [0.125]
Skilled Workers in Agriculture, Forestry -1.132 -0.326 -0.295 -0.133
[0.687] [0.315] [0.315] [0.326]
Artisans -2.004*** -0.327*** -0.254*** 0.0150
[0.258] [0.0824] [0.0839] [0.155]
Technicians/Operators -1.681*** -0.179** -0.118 0.108
[0.295] [0.0806] [0.0864] [0.157]
Unskilled Workers -2.155*** -0.343*** -0.266** 0.0239
[0.220] [0.0902] [0.0906] [0.160]
Sector of Employment (Baseline: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing)
Mining -0.456 0.408 0.423 0.485*
[0.793] [0.264] [0.259] [0.258]
Manufacturing -0.00904 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.220***
[0.266] [0.0603] [0.0539] [0.0419]
Electricity, Gas, and Water Services 1.060 0.392** 0.356** 0.211
[0.738] [0.154] [0.152] [0.172]
Construction 0.442* 0.158** 0.139** 0.0827*
[0.209] [0.0680] [0.0624] [0.0479]
Sales, Repairs 0.185 -0.0176 -0.0270 -0.0492
[0.235] [0.0674] [0.0618] [0.0480]
Hotels and Restaurants -0.361 0.0752 0.0852 0.137**
[0.270] [0.0806] [0.0740] [0.0642]
Shipping, Telecommunications 0.219 0.157* 0.146* 0.120*
[0.232] [0.0781] [0.0745] [0.0649]
Financial Services 1.078** 0.152 0.111 -0.0316
[0.437] [0.180] [0.169] [0.117]
Real Estate Businesses 0.971*** 0.0126 -0.0262 -0.153**
[0.304] [0.0791] [0.0721] [0.0702]
Public Administration, Defense 1.315** 0.503*** 0.454*** 0.279***
[0.526] [0.133] [0.122] [0.105]
Education 1.592*** 0.230 0.171 -0.0413
[0.401] [0.131] [0.118] [0.0912]
Health, Social Services -0.350 -0.117 -0.107 -0.0574
[0.205] [0.0716] [0.0689] [0.0631]
Constant 6.296*** -1.579*** -1.791*** -2.653***
[0.402] [0.185] [0.234] [0.387]
Observations 7,146 7,146 7,146 7,146
R-squared 0.247 0.272 0.287 0.059
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Effect of the Education Policy on Employment Status 
 
  
Policy Dummy -0.0574*** Policy Dummy -0.159**
[0.0111] [0.0611]
Year of Birth Trend -0.0488*** Year of Birth Trend 0.0802***
[0.00222] [0.00634]
Year of Birth Trend Squared -0.00113*** Year of Birth Trend Squared -0.00154
[6.57e-05] [0.00129]
Age Effect (Baseline: 15-19 age group)
20-24 age group -0.0752***
[0.00776]
Year Effects (Baseline: 2002, 2003) Year Effects (Baseline: 2002)
2004 0.109*** 2003-2004 -0.128***
[0.0105] [0.00266]
2005 0.217*** 2005-2006 -0.177***
[0.00677] [0.00549]
2006 0.306*** 2007-2008 -0.198***
[0.00483] [0.0185]
2007 0.378*** 2009-2010 -0.172***
[0.00664] [0.0275]
2008 0.504***
[0.00711]
2009 0.624***
[0.00879]
2010 0.722***
[0.0102]
Relation to Household Head (Baseline: Other) Relation to Household Head (Baseline: Other)
Household Head 0.170*** Household Head 0.192***
[0.0186] [0.0185]
Son of Household Head -0.0113 Son of Household Head 0.0212
[0.0100] [0.0196]
Relationship Status (Baseline: Single) Relationship Status (Baseline: Single)
Partnered 0.288*** Partnered 0.281***
[0.0112] [0.0128]
Constant 0.603*** Constant 0.371***
[0.0111] [0.0197]
Observations 21,437 Observations 8,860
R-squared 0.170 R-squared 0.097
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A) 15- to 24-year-olds B) 20- to 24-year-olds 
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Appendix A – Control variables 
 
i) Relation to household head: This is categorized into three in the analysis: i) 
household head, ii) son of household head, iii) other. 
ii) Marital Status: This is categorized into two in the analysis: i) partnered 
(married/cohabiting), ii) single (never married/divorced/ widowed/separated) 
iii) Type of Employment: There are 4 categories: i) salary earner, ii) wage earner, iii) 
business owner, iv) self-employed. 
iv) Occupation: There are 9 categories: i) upper-level administrative; ii) professional; 
iii) assistant professional; iv) office and customer services; v) services and sales 
workers; vi) skilled workers in agriculture, forestry, etc.; vii) artisans; viii) 
technicians/operators; ix) unskilled workers. 
v) Sector of Employment: There are 13 categories: i) agriculture, forestry, fishing; ii) 
mining; iii) manufacturing; iv) electricity, gas, and water services; v) construction; 
vi) sales, repairs; vii) hotels and restaurants, viii) shipping, telecommunications; 
ix) financial services; x) real estate businesses, xi) public administration, defense; 
xii) education, xiii) health, social services. 
 
 
